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Open-Mindedness as a Critical Virtue
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Abstract This paper proposes to examine Daniel Co-
hen’s recent attempt to apply virtues to argumentation
theory, with special attention given to his explication of
how open-mindedness can be regarded as an argumenta-
tional or critical virtue. It is argued that his analysis in-
volves a contentious claim about open-mindedness as an
epistemic virtue, which generates a tension for agents who
are simultaneously both an arguer and a knower (or who
strive to be both). I contend that this tension can be eased
or resolved by clarifying the nature of open-mindedness
and by construing open-mindedness in terms of its func-
tion. Specifically, a willingness to take a novel viewpoint
seriously is sufficient for making open-mindedness both an
epistemic and a critical virtue.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, I examine Daniel Cohen’s recent attempt to
apply a virtue-based approach to argumentation theory,
focusing on his analysis of open-mindedness as a critical or
argumentational virtue (Cohen 2009).1 Although Cohen’s
conclusion that an arguer should cultivate open-minded-
ness as a critical virtue is well-taken, his analysis poses a
problem for agents who are both an arguer and a knower, or
who strive to be both. My assessment is that Cohen’s ar-
gument hinges on a contentious claim about open-mind-
edness as an epistemic virtue. To resolve this problem, I
argue that we need to clarify the nature of open-minded-
ness. I do this by examining recent accounts of open-
mindedness in virtue epistemology, and proposing a func-
tional view that demonstrates how open-mindedness can be
both a critical and an epistemic virtue. While the main
focus of this paper is to address Cohen’s analysis, it serves
at the same time to examine the character trait of open-
mindedness, and to illustrate how a virtue can take on
different statuses (i.e., intellectual, epistemic, and
argumentational).
A word is fitting at this point to spell out some of the
underlying assumptions in this study. This paper accepts
that the ‘aretaic turn’ as it applies to argumentational the-
ory is a viable project, and that such a turn offers promising
insights into questions that currently beset the subject (e.g.,
Aberdein 2010, 2014; Cohen 2005, 2009). Also, it takes for
granted that it is permissible to apply the virtues at the level
of arguers (as opposed to arguments, though it does not rule
out that there might be virtues that are also applicable to
the latter). For instance, appealing to virtues to distinguish
good arguers from bad ones does not commit the fallacy of
ad hominem, at least not in a vicious way (see Aberdein
2010, 2014). Lastly, following Aberdein and Cohen, this
paper also construes ‘arguer’ broadly to refer not only to
the person doing the arguing, but also to anyone who re-
sponds, participates, or observes in the course of the ar-
gument (Cohen 2009; Aberdein 2010).
1 In this paper, I will use the terms ‘critical’ and ‘argumentational’
interchangeably.
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2 The Tension
Let us begin with some general remarks about open-
mindedness. Although the application of virtues to argu-
mentation theory makes no claim to what Guy Axtell calls
virtue reliabilist or virtue responsibilist epistemologies, the
discussion below will assume both the latter to be the
working premises (Axtell 1997). Open-mindedness as
construed here is a character trait, as opposed to a sub-
personal cognitive state or faculty, which the agent is in-
volved in or makes an effort at cultivating and exercising.
Moreover, her involvement helps to bring about some
cognitive goods or enables her to reach various cognitive
achievements. If the agent’s exercise of open-mindedness
is motivated, for example, by getting to the truth or
achieving knowledge, then the virtue to be attained is re-
garded as an epistemic one (e.g., Baehr 2011; Riggs
2010).2 By contrast, if her exercise is ‘‘an expression out of
moral concern’’, that is, with what is right or wrong, then
the end virtue is viewed as a moral one (e.g., Arpaly 2011).
In either instance, given the agent’s involvement, she can
be credited for cultivating and exercising open-minded-
ness. Depending on whether she exercises it as a moral and/
or intellectual virtue, her personal moral and/or intellectual
worth may also proportionately increase (Baehr 2012).
According to Cohen, open-mindedness can also be re-
garded as a critical or argumentational virtue. In his view,
argumentational virtues are ‘‘aids on the way to achieve-
ments in argumentation’’ (Cohen 2009, 54) and ‘‘can be
defined by the [cognitive] goods that they help us procure
and by the accomplishments that they help us achieve in
the course of argumentation’’ (55). Such goods include
those derivable from the three standard branches of argu-
mentation, namely, valid argument in logic, rational per-
suasion in rhetoric, and ‘‘critically achieved consensus’’ in
dialectic. They also comprise those that can be brought
about by argument but which do not ‘‘fit neatly into’’ the
above three categories (ibid.). Here is Cohen’s list:
• a deepened understanding of one’s own position;
• improvement of one’s position;
• abandonment of a standpoint for a better one, other
than the opponent’s;
• a deepened understanding of an opponent’s position;
• acknowledgement of (the reasonableness of) another’s
position;
• greater attention to previously over-looked or under-
valued details;
• better grasp of connections and how things might be fit
together in a big picture (ibid., his italics).
Why should we think of open-mindedness as a critical or
argumentational virtue? Regarding the nature of the char-
acter trait of open-mindedness, Cohen does not spend much
time on elucidating it, relying instead, for the most part, on
a standard definition used in critical thinking and on the
usage of the term in a debate in the philosophy of education
(e.g., Hare 1985a, b; Hare and McLaughlin 1998; Gardner
1996; McLaughlin 1990). Accordingly, open-mindedness
as Cohen understands it consists of ‘‘the ability to listen
carefully, the willingness to take what others say seriously,
and if called for, the resolve to adopt them as one’s own’’
(Cohen 2009, 56). To this description, he adds a comple-
mentary component: open-mindedness also includes the
‘‘willingness, ability, and resolve to re-examine one’s own
beliefs and, if called for, to let them go. Belief revision is
not just a matter of belief-acquisition; it also involves be-
lief modification and even belief rejection’’ (ibid., his
underline).
The reason Cohen thinks that open-mindedness is a
critical virtue is that the intellectual activities associated
with the character trait facilitate the realization of the
cognitive goods identified above. To get a deepened un-
derstanding of an opponent’s position, for instance, the
arguer cannot simply go through the motions by listening
to it. If there is no real possibility that the arguer can
change her mind after hearing her opponent out—a possi-
bility that is brought about only if she is open-minded—
then the arguer does not gain anything from the argument.
Given that open-mindedness is instrumental to the suc-
cessful attainment of these goods, it is therefore deemed an
argumentational virtue. Moreover, since keeping an open
mind can help bring about such a wide range of cognitive
goods, Cohen concludes that ‘‘[w]hen it comes [to] our
more general cognitive and critical projects, open-mind-
edness seems to be valuable across the board’’ (ibid.).
To highlight this point about the value of open-mind-
edness as an ‘‘almost uniformly’’ cognitive virtue (56–57),
Cohen contrasts it with the value of the character trait as an
epistemic virtue. As mentioned above, what makes a virtue
the kind of virtue that it is (i.e., epistemic, moral or critical)
depends on the kinds of goods that one hopes to gain from
exercising it. In this case, what makes open-mindedness an
epistemic virtue is that an agent’s being open-minded is
supposed to increase one’s chances of achieving knowl-
edge or getting to the truth. Thus, if a person is willing to
take what others say seriously under the right circum-
stances, she stands a better chance of getting to the truth
and acquiring knowledge. But not all circumstances,
2 Cohen distinguishes intellectual (or cognitive) virtues from epis-
temic ones. For him, the latter are concerned principally with the
acquisition of true belief and knowledge, whereas the former
incorporate a wider range of goods (e.g., understanding, discharging
our responsibilities as arguers). While many virtue epistemologists
refer to open-mindedness as an intellectual virtue, they are essentially
referring to it as an epistemic virtue in Cohen’s sense. Unless
otherwise noted, this paper will follow Cohen’s usage.
according to Cohen, are right. As he notes, open-minded-
ness ‘‘is not always or necessarily an epistemic virtue’’
(57). Indeed, Aberdein even goes so far as to characterize
Cohen’s position as saying that open-mindedness is an
epistemic vice (Aberdein 2010, 174).
Consider someone whose beliefs are mostly true. Would
such a person stand to gain anything from being open-
minded? Cohen does not think so: ‘‘simply allowing that
[our strongly held beliefs] be up for discussion calls them
into question—and calling beliefs into question, even ones
that are well-justified, runs the risk of losing them’’ (Cohen
2009, 57). If the ultimate goal for being open-minded is to
get to the truth, then we should not be open-minded when a
cherished truth might be at stake. Indeed, Cohen claims
that open-mindedness ‘‘is most important for people whose
beliefs are mostly unjustified or wrong’’ (ibid.). Open-
mindedness, therefore, is not necessarily an epistemic vir-
tue for everyone under all circumstances; its value as an
epistemic virtue is circumscribed and localized. But if
open-mindedness has such a restricted application, what
explains our intuition that cultivating such a character trait
is generally a good thing? Or as Cohen puts it, isn’t it ‘‘a
priori that being open-minded is intellectually more virtu-
ous than being closed-minded’’ (59)? Here is where open-
mindedness as a critical virtue enters the picture. Accord-
ing to Cohen, ‘‘there is more to open-mindedness than its
role in epistemic pursuits’’ (ibid). As noted above, it also
plays a significant role in argumentational contexts,
specifically by helping us reap the aforementioned non-
epistemic cognitive goods on Cohen’s list. These extra-
epistemic pursuits, then, are what make open-mindedness
almost always a cognitive virtue.
To summarize, Cohen makes two claims: (1) when
open-mindedness is exercised with the aim of reaping non-
epistemic cognitive goods from argument, it is a virtue
‘‘across the board’’; and (2) when open-mindedness is ex-
ercised in a context related to the pursuit of knowledge, it is
not always or necessarily an epistemic virtue. In my view,
these two claims, when taken collectively, cause an
uneasiness with respect to our status as intellectual agents,
that is, as agents with epistemic, argumentational and other
cognitive interests. If an agent is arguing with an opponent
in a context in which her cognitive goals are completely
severed from the pursuit of knowledge—e.g., she hopes to
catch the nuances of her opponent’s views that she has
glossed over before—then by (1), she should exercise
open-mindedness so as to reap the non-epistemic cognitive
goods. And if an agent argues in a context in which her
central aim is the acquisition of knowledge—e.g., if one of
her cherished beliefs is challenged—then by (2), she should
exercise caution in being open-minded for fear of losing
her beliefs, or ending up in a weaker epistemic position.
A tension arises, I contend, when we acknowledge that
there are very few scenarios in which we are just arguing or
just pursuing knowledge. In many cases, I submit that we
are doing both simultaneously, which makes us at once
both arguers and knowers. For instance, we typically argue
with others over issues that we care about, have a stake in,
or want to learn more about, with the hope to uncover
truths or to acquire knowledge. However, given Cohen’s
claims about the different statuses of open-mindedness as a
virtue, we find ourselves in a predicament: When we are
not merely arguing or merely pursuing knowledge, but are
doing both, should we strive to be open-minded?
The answer, it would seem, is ‘no’. Many of the cog-
nitive gains of open-mindedness on Cohen’s list—for in-
stance, a deepened understanding of an opponent’s position
and an acknowledgement of another’s reasonableness—
while non-epistemic in nature, require that we treat an
opponent’s views seriously. But as Jonathan Adler has
pointed out, this seems to require that we entertain the
possibility that these views are true, and by implication,
that one’s own views might be mistaken (Adler 2004). For
instance, suppose I am a hardcore physicalist about mental
states and I am arguing with someone who is a substance
dualist. If one of my goals is to understand my opponent’s
position or to acknowledge its reasonableness, I will have
to put myself ‘‘in her shoes’’ to see the merits of her view. If
Adler is correct, then my entertaining an opponent’s view
seriously—that is, my exercising an open mind—even
though it is done under the pursuit of the stated non-epis-
temic cognitive goals, runs the risk noted above: I am
placing my beliefs on the table and may end up losing them.
In other words, some of the cognitive goods on Cohen’s list
turn out to be not completely free from epistemic pursuits.
Indeed, Cohen acknowledges this possibility of the argu-
mentational preempting the epistemic when he makes the
case for the importance of open-mindedness as an argu-
mentational virtue by contrasting it with one’s failure to
exhibit it. According to Cohen, someone who fails to be
open-minded closes the door on the possibility of ‘‘actually
revising one’s standpoint as a result of listening to objec-
tions’’ (2009, 59). But why worry about revising one’s
standpoint if all one is doing falls strictly under the argu-
mentational? I contend that it is because the attainment of
some of the cognitive goods on Cohen’s list requires us to
engage in activities that have epistemic consequences, most
notably, by putting our beliefs on the table.
Here is an alternative way to capture this tension. In-
tuitively, it seems plausible for someone to strive to be both
a good arguer and a good knower. But this aspiration seems
to be blocked by Cohen’s two claims discussed above.
Again, if an agent wants to be just a good arguer with no
regard for truth and knowledge, she will, among other
things, aim to be open-minded toward her opponent’s
views so as to reap the cognitive gains on Cohen’s list. And
if an agent wants to be just a good knower, she will refrain
from being open-minded at least with respect to beliefs that
she holds closely.3 But what happens if she wants to be
both a good arguer and a good knower? Should or
shouldn’t she be open-minded? Perhaps we can answer this
once we work out the details of the nature and importance
of the beliefs or standpoints involved, weigh the pros and
cons in terms of the goods to be gained or lost, and so on
(more on this point below). Suffice it to note now that
Cohen’s dual claims cause a tension that would not
otherwise arise when one aims to be good in both activities
of arguing and knowing.
What my argument so far shows is that while there are
argumentational activities that are not epistemic or do not
stem from epistemic concerns, they nevertheless are inex-
tricably linked to the pursuit of knowledge. Conducting
these activities potentially places our beliefs on the table
and therefore, puts us at risk of losing them. Insofar as we
are simultaneously arguers and knowers, and as such, incur
both argumentational and epistemic obligations, we must
exercise caution in being open-minded, in the interest of
preserving our true beliefs. An important implication of
this epistemic constraint is that in practice the value of
open-mindedness as a cognitive virtue may be just as local
and ‘‘dependent on context and situation’’ as that of open-
mindedness as an epistemic virtue (Cohen 2009, 58). At the
minimum, any cognitive gain on Cohen’s list that results in
one’s beliefs being confronted or ‘‘put on the table,’’ so to
speak, must be eliminated. Indeed, I think a further argu-
ment can be made to show that every cognitive gain on his
list runs the risk of requiring an agent to abandon her true
beliefs. In arguing with an opponent, an agent can easily
fail to accomplish what she sets out to do. For example, she
may want to get a deepened understanding of her own
position through arguing with an opponent, but may realize
in the process or afterwards that she never fully understood
it in the first place, thus causing her either to abandon it or
to approach it with a weakened confidence.4 Similarly, an
agent may be too successful in acknowledging the rea-
sonableness of another’s position: after argument, she may
realize that the alternative position is not only reasonable
but also more plausible than her own. Again, such a
realization takes place only if she is open-minded, as it can
cause her to give up her original view. Whether an argu-
ment can be made for or against the remaining gains on the
list is an issue I will not explore here. Suffice it to note now
that Cohen’s claims (1) and (2) jointly threaten to make
open-mindedness as a cognitive virtue just as contingent, or
in Cohen’s words, ‘‘locally’’ useful, as open-mindedness is
as an epistemic virtue.
At this point, I would like to pause and consider an
objection that may be raised against my argument.5 So far,
I have assumed that whenever epistemic obligations or
considerations are pitted against argumentational ones, the
former always trump or nullify the latter. Thus, if being
open-minded involves engaging in certain cognitive ac-
tivities that unnecessarily open up our true beliefs for
questioning with the promise only of gain of certain non-
epistemic cognitive goods, I have suggested that we ought
not pursue them; otherwise, we would be violating our
epistemic obligations of preserving our true beliefs and
knowledge. But why must epistemic considerations always
trump the argumentational? Could not the prospect of
reaping some of the cognitive goods on Cohen’s list
override the risk of losing one’s true beliefs?
There are, in my view, two ways in which we can re-
spond to this objection. The first is to furnish an explana-
tion as to why epistemic considerations should trump
argumentational ones. One way to do so is to point out how
argumentational virtues relate to epistemic ones. According
to Aberdein, whereas epistemic virtues track truth and
moral virtues track the good, argumentational virtues
propagate truths (2010, 173). This way of thinking about
what the virtues of an ideal arguer track, Aberdein notes, is
consistent with all of the cognitive goals on Cohen’s list.
What it means for these virtues to propagate truth, in his
view, is that virtuous arguments ‘‘should provide inter-
locutors and audience with new true beliefs, or at least
reasons to increase the confidence with which they hold to
existing true beliefs’’ (ibid.). Similarly, the ‘‘outcome of an
argument between virtuous arguers would be a wider dis-
tribution of true beliefs’’ (ibid.) For Aberdein, then, the
difference between a virtuous knower and a virtuous arguer
is that the former is ‘‘disposed to act in a way that leads to
the acquisition of true beliefs’’, while the latter is ‘‘dis-
posed to spread true beliefs around’’ (ibid., my italics).6
3 Incidentally, as Riggs has pointed out, it is precisely with respect to
beliefs that we hold closely that we should exercise open-mindedness
(177). This is because many of them—e.g., political and religious
ones—may have been acquired dubiously (i.e., through biases and/or
cognitive weaknesses or blind-spots).
4 The agent’s discovery that she does not have as good an
understanding of her original view does not necessarily imply that
her view is false. She may, for example, simply have trouble grasping
some of its more difficult components.
5 I would like to thank an anonymous referee for raising this
objection.
6 In my view, Aberdein’s claims confirm my earlier point regarding
the close ties between the argumentational and the epistemic in terms
of truth: arguing is a means by which to change the epistemic status of
another (including one’s own). Indeed, notice that an agent’s firmly
held beliefs, which, according to Cohen, should allow no room for
open-mindedness, are ready information for her to relay to others. But
when she tries to do so, to repeat an earlier point, she may fall short of
Notice that if Aberdein is correct, then this gives us reason
for favoring the epistemic over the argumentational when a
tension exists between them: Insofar as the function of
argumentational virtues is supposed to propagate truths,
any intellectual activity that runs counter to this function,
e.g., by unnecessarily calling these true beliefs into ques-
tion and causing their potential loss, must be exercised with
caution or altogether avoided. Otherwise, the open-minded
arguer, far from spreading true beliefs, may be instilling
false ones in others and reinforcing these for herself.
The second way to respond to the objection is to con-
cede that there may well be cognitive goods on Cohen’s list
that justify the epistemic risk of losing true beliefs or
knowledge. In response to the earlier query as to whether
we, qua arguers and knowers, should exercise open-
mindedness, the answer is now ‘‘yes’’. Such a concession,
however, does little to allay worries about the initial ten-
sion with respect to Cohen’s dual claims. Agents who are
simultaneously arguers and knowers (or who strive to be
good at both) would still find themselves in conflict in
deciding to be open-minded. Although they may now reap
certain non-epistemic cognitive goods by being open-
minded, and thus bolster their status as good arguers, they
do so at the expense of failing to meet their epistemic
obligations (i.e., losing previously held beliefs), and thus
jeopardize their status as good knowers. In short, they
would remain troubled by their status as intellectual agents
motivated by epistemic, argumentational and other cogni-
tive interests.
Let us take stock of the argument so far. To clarify, the
present argument does not challenge Cohen’s contention
that there are non-epistemic cognitive goods that can be
obtained from exercising open-mindedness. Indeed, I agree
with him that this observation furnishes strong grounds for
positing open-mindedness as an argumentational virtue.
However, some of these non-epistemic cognitive goods
require that we engage in activities that have epistemic
consequences, such as placing our beliefs on the table and
running the risk of losing them. Now, this is unproblematic
if our intellectual aspirations are such that we want only to
be good arguers, and therefore, are only bound by argu-
mentational obligations. But as I noted above, we seldom
are simply arguers with no concern for truth or knowledge.
In most contexts, we also are knowers with obligations to
preserve our true beliefs and to acquire knowledge. Given
these latter obligations, we cannot therefore regard open-
mindedness as a cognitive virtue in practice as valuable
across the board.
Insofar as the tension identified in Cohen’s argument
arises from his two claims about open-mindedness, it can
be resolved by rejecting one or both of these claims. As
mentioned at the outset, I support Cohen’s contention that
open-mindedness deserves to be treated as a critical virtue.
I am also inclined to agree with him that it is ‘‘a priori that
being open-minded is intellectually more virtuous than
being close-minded’’ (2009, 59). In the next section, I
propose to make good the claim that open-mindedness as
an intellectual virtue is at once an epistemic and argu-
mentational virtue. My way out of the tension in Cohen’s
argument is to reject his claim that open-mindedness is not
always necessarily an epistemic virtue.7 To do so, we need
to reconsider the nature and definition of open-mindedness
as a character trait.
3 Rethinking Open-Mindedness
As noted earlier, Cohen does not say much about the nature
of open-mindedness; instead, he relies on a textbook
definition and on usage by some theorists in the philosophy
of education: the former explains open-mindedness as ‘‘the
ability to listen carefully, the willingness to take what others
say seriously, and, if called for, the resolve to adopt them as
one’s own’’, and the latter, as advanced by William Hare,
points to ‘‘the willingness to entertain objections and, if
appropriate, revise one’s position’’ (Cohen 2009, 56).
However, as some theorists have observed (e.g., Baehr 2011;
Riggs 2010), these definitions are problematic because they
are too broad, encompassing intellectual activities that are
not distinctive to open-mindedness. According to them, an
important desideratum for theorizing about intellectual vir-
tues is that we have to explain why a virtue is an intellectual
virtue but also why it is that particular intellectual virtue. Put
another way, we have to explain why it deserves the status as
an intellectual virtue, and how it is distinct from other traits
that might also be regarded as intellectual virtues. As Riggs
has argued, the problem with the foregoing definitions (and
he specifically has Hare’s in mind) is that they construe
open-mindedness so comprehensively that ‘‘it seems noth-
ing short of rationality itself’’, and that they seem ‘‘to vir-
tually equate being open-minded with being intellectually
virtuous tout court’’ (Riggs, 179). As he notes, ‘‘if someone
Footnote 6 continued
the task: she may encounter objections that she discovers she cannot
answer. This of course does not necessarily imply that her beliefs are
false, but it does put her at an epistemic risk. In such a case, not only
will she fail to disseminate what to her are true beliefs, but she will
also have to revise her own epistemic position: either to abandon
those beliefs or to reduce her confidence in them. At any rate, the
agent’s exercise of open-mindedness, although done with the intent to
bring about certain non-epistemic cognitive goals (i.e., to make her
beliefs accessible to others), results, directly or indirectly, in exposing
the weaknesses of her beliefs and even in losing them.
7 Indeed, most virtue epistemologists already think of open-minded-
ness as an epistemic virtue, and regard it as one of the most important
ones (Baehr 2011; Riggs 2010).
is ‘disposed to revise or reject the position he holds if sound
objections are brought against it, or… make up his mind in
the light of available evidence as objectively and impartially
as possible,’ what is left to say about the quality of his rea-
soning? (Hare 1979, 9)’’ (ibid.).
Here, I leave it open as to whether Cohen fully sub-
scribes to Hare’s view of open-mindedness (and thus, the
extent to which the above criticism applies to him); indeed,
one gets the impression that Cohen’s main concern has less
to do with what it means for someone to be open-minded,
which he takes to be generally unproblematic and well-
understood, than with whether its status as a virtue can
extend beyond the epistemic (i.e., to the argumentational).
Nevertheless, I think we can adapt Riggs’s criticism to take
issue with Cohen’s claim that open-mindedness is not
necessarily an epistemic virtue. Recall Cohen’s argument
for it: ‘‘[S]imply allowing that [our beliefs] be up for dis-
cussion calls them into question—and calling beliefs into
question, even ones that are well-justified, runs the risk of
losing them’’ (2009, 57). Similarly, he observes that for
people ‘‘whose beliefs are mostly in order’’, open-mind-
edness ‘‘is epistemologically risky, unnecessary, and un-
wise. It will lead away from justified beliefs’’ (ibid.).
In my view, Cohen’s attribution of this unwelcome
epistemic consequence to open-mindedness is question-
able. While being open-minded may lead to a loss of jus-
tified beliefs, it may also lead to other outcomes such as
steadfastness in the face of the challenge or even acquiring,
in its wake, a strengthened confidence in held beliefs. In-
deed, if all we are told is that an agent is open-minded, we
cannot even speculate on the likelihood of any of these
possibilities. What this establishes is that open-mindedness
(or putting one’s beliefs on the table) is not only com-
patible with either the loss or retention of one’s beliefs, but
also, more importantly, is neutral in the determination of
the outcome. Rather, what is directly responsible for the
outcome, I contend, are other intellectual activities that
take place once the agent exercises open-mindedness.8
Thus, when an agent loses her justified beliefs, such a
consequence may be due to her inadequate skills (e.g., her
incompetency at certain tasks), or faulty cognitive abilities
and faculties (e.g., a faulty memory or proneness to mis-
takes when making logical inferences). It can also be due to
her possession of negative character traits, such as the
intellectual vices of carelessness, inattentiveness, laziness,
and impatience. Any or any combination of these, which
have little to do with being open-minded, can occur once
the agent calls her beliefs into question. Moreover, any or
any combination of these, I submit, is sufficient for causing
the agent to lose a true belief or to replace it with a false
one. In short, once we properly circumscribe the role of
open-mindedness, minimally by recognizing that it is
compatible with either the loss or retention of beliefs, then
we see that the risk of losing true beliefs lies elsewhere in
other intellectual operations. Contrary to Cohen, then,
open-mindedness is not the culprit for an agent’s losing her
justified beliefs.
Another argument that we can make against Cohen is
that his argument conflates the following claims about
open-mindedness: (a) open-mindedness is not necessarily
an epistemic virtue; and (b) open-mindedness is an epis-
temic virtue but ought not to be applied all of the time. One
of the reasons he offers for (a) is that the value of open-
mindedness is dependent on context and situation. For in-
stance, he claims that the ‘‘willingness to entertain every-
thing entails entertaining such possible defeaters for
justification as dreams and evil demons and alternative
conceptual schemes’’. Skepticism will result, leading to ‘‘a
complete loss of knowledge and a disastrous end to that
epistemic project’’ (2009, 58). But what this shows is not
that open-mindedness is not an epistemic virtue but only
that it ought not to be applied all of the time. Indeed, those
who argue that open-mindedness is an important epistemic
virtue specify conditions under which we exercise it. For
example, Baehr argues that ‘‘a person S’s engaging in the
activity characteristic of open-mindedness under circum-
stances C is intellectually virtuous only if it is reasonable
for S to believe that engaging in this activity in C may be
helpful for reaching the truth’’ (2011, 210). By this crite-
rion, Baehr may prescribe that an agent can refuse to en-
tertain the aforementioned defeaters if doing so does not
bring her closer to the truth. The important point to note,
however, is that Baehr argues this while maintaining that
open-mindedness is an epistemic virtue. Similarly, Riggs
submits that ‘‘an open-minded person need not take all
challenges to her beliefs seriously. Moreover, such a person
can decline such a challenge regarding p while being open-
minded about p’’ (186, his italics). For our purposes, it is
not necessary to go into detail about the conditions under
which an agent can rightfully decline a challenge to her
view. Suffice it to note that Riggs, too, recognizes open-
mindedness as an epistemic virtue but does not think that it
ought to be applied all of the time.
Let us now consider a parallel argument in the argu-
mentational context. Despite holding that open-mindedness
is an important critical virtue, one can still acknowledge
conditions under which it should not be applied. In line
8 It is beyond the scope of this paper to go into detail about what an
agent might do once she puts a belief on the table. However, I find it
instructive to think of it in terms of what Robert Brandom calls the
‘game of giving and asking for reasons’, a discursive practice in
which the commitments and entitlements of an agent and her
interlocutors are made explicit and defended (Brandom 1994). Here,
we can imagine numerous ways in which an agent might exhibit
failings that can cause her to abandon her beliefs (e.g., the discovery
that she is not entitled to a particular view, or that her current position
commits her to unwanted consequences).
with Baehr’s viewpoint, an agent can reasonably refuse to
be open-minded when she does not believe that being so
can help her, say, reach any of the argumentational goals
on Cohen’s list (e.g., a deepened understanding of one’s
position or an opponent’s, or a better grasp of conceptual
connections). In fact, as suggested in the previous section,
in certain contexts, open-mindedness may even turn into an
argumentational vice. For instance, an agent may not only
fail to gain a deepened understanding of her opponent’s
position, but may even come out of the argument more
confused about it. But the fact remains that exceptions like
this do not repudiate open-mindedness as an important
critical virtue but simply indicate that this virtue is not
applicable all of the time. In a similar vein, then, even in
conditions and contexts where open-mindedness is not
called for, its status and importance as an epistemic virtue
remain fully intact.
So far, I have argued that Cohen’s claim that open-
mindedness is not always an epistemic virtue can be dis-
puted. Moreover, I have shown that there is a need to
clarify the nature of open-mindedness. How then should we
construe the character trait? Specifically, how should we
define open-mindedness such that it remains an argumen-
tational virtue and can be an epistemic virtue at the same
time? As mentioned, one conclusion that can be drawn
from the foregoing discussion is that a working view of
open-mindedness needs to be carefully circumscribed.
Some recent views of open-mindedness in virtue episte-
mology are helpful, but are developed with specific theo-
retical desiderata in mind. The discussion below will
bypass those aspects that are not pertinent to our concern.
My primary aim is to extract from them considerations that
will enhance our understanding of open-mindedness as
both a critical and an epistemic virtue.
Let us begin with Wayne Riggs’s theory. According to
him, to be open-minded is ‘‘to be aware of one’s fallibility
as a believer, and to be willing to acknowledge the possi-
bility that anytime one believes something, it is possible
that one is wrong’’ (180, his italics). This is why when an
open-minded person encounters a challenge, he is willing
to ‘‘[respond] by (at least sometimes) taking such a chal-
lenge seriously’’ (ibid).9 Her fallibilism explains why she is
willing to take challenges to her views seriously, even
when she holds these views with strong conviction. We can
conclude from Riggs’s argument that an open-minded
person takes challenges seriously. This formulation incor-
porates the requirement of the character trait and is an
improvement over the textbook definition and Hare’s, for it
limits the range of activity associated with open-minded-
ness. It merely emphasizes what an agent is disposed to do
upon encountering a challenge and refrains from specifying
the subsequent courses of cognitive activities.
As Riggs’s theory stands, however, it needs to be
modified. Notice that Riggs’s definition is concerned pri-
marily with cases of open-mindedness in which one’s
views are under direct challenge. But as other theorists
have pointed out, there are cases of open-mindedness that
do not involve any such challenge. For example, Baehr
raises the example of a judge who has to give a neutral
assessment of the opening arguments at a trial. The judge’s
personal beliefs are not challenged, but he still has to keep
an open mind in order to take both arguments seriously in
weighing their relative merits. Baehr also identifies cases of
open-mindedness in which agents need not perform any
rational assessment. For instance, science students at-
tempting to understand Einstein’s general theory of rela-
tivity may find it necessary to ‘open up’ their minds in
order to grasp a radical way of thinking about reality.
Notice that both of Baehr’s examples have analogues in the
argumentational context, specifically in the cognitive ac-
tivities associated with the goals on Cohen’s list. For in-
stance, implicit lemmas or assumptions may be brought up
by a participant in order to bolster a premise or two in an
argument. These may be ideas of which an arguer has
never heard, and they may not conflict with any of her
existing views. Still, to understand them, she will need to
open up her mind. Also, an arguer, especially understood in
the broad terms intended by Cohen and by Aberdein, may
find herself at a juncture in a dispute with multiple par-
ticipants where she has to adjudicate between competing
views. In order to be fair and impartial, she will have to be
willing to ‘‘listen to both sides of an issue, to follow the
arguments or evidence where they lead, and to refrain from
bringing the inquiry to a hasty or premature conclusion’’
(Baehr 2011, 200).
Riggs’s requirement, therefore, needs to be able to ac-
commodate these additional cases. How might it be im-
proved? Here, it is useful to consider the definition
proposed by Baehr, who is interested in uncovering the
conceptual core of open-mindedness with the above ex-
amples. His description below is instructive: ‘‘An open-
minded person is characteristically (a) willing and (within
limits) able (b) to transcend a default cognitive standpoint
(c) in order to take up or take seriously the merits of (d) a
distinct cognitive standpoint’’ (202). For Baehr, (b) consti-
tutes the conceptual core of open-mindedness. All of the
agents in the cited examples—the believer, the judge, and
the science students—are considered open-minded pre-
cisely because they are willing and able to set aside, to
suspend, or to loosen their grip on their usual ways of
thinking when they encounter a novel standpoint. Baehr’s
definition is an improvement over Riggs’s because it asks
that an agent take seriously any standpoint, regardless of
9 Riggs uses the qualifier ‘at least sometimes’ because as mentioned
above, he does not think that we should always be open-minded.
whether it conflicts with her own views or requires rational
assessment. Still, Baehr’s definition is not without prob-
lems. For instance, it is not clear whether cognitive tran-
scendence is necessary for open-mindedness. In my view,
cognitive transcendence appears necessary only in cases
where the standpoint expresses a deep opposition or is of
such a radically different nature that an agent needs to
suspend her own views in order to grapple with it. But for
standpoints of a more ordinary nature, say, ones that differ
in minor respects but stand in opposition to one’s own,
cognitive transcendence seems unnecessary in order for the
agent to understand and to take them seriously. In such a
case, she will still be said to be open-minded.
We now have the ingredients for an outline of a theory
of open-mindedness that treats it as both an argumenta-
tional and an epistemic virtue. What we extract from
Riggs’s view is that open-mindedness requires one to take
challenges seriously and from Baehr’s, that we should
expand this requirement for application to standpoints that
do not require conflict resolution or rational assessment.
Putting the two together, open-mindedness amounts to the
idea that we should take a distinct novel standpoint seri-
ously. To further define it, recall that someone who is open-
minded towards a standpoint, say, S, can either accept or
reject it; being open-minded implies no definite course of
action, much less any specific outcome, as it is a neutral
cognitive state prior to the agent’s eventual commitment.
What this indicates is that open-mindedness serves a
specific function, which can be characterized as follows: an
agent is open-minded when she is willing to let S into her
mind and to take it seriously. This function, I would con-
tend, is the heart of the character trait of open-mindedness.
It is exercised by all of the agents in Baehr’s examples. Of
course, what exactly the agent will do when she takes
S seriously depends on what S is (i.e., an idea, a deductive
argument, or an inductive inference) and what the epis-
temic context calls for. If S is a deductive argument, for
example, the agent will assess its validity; if S is a novel
idea brought in by an opponent to strengthen her premise,
she will try to see how it relates to what she knows and will
draw connections; if S is a proposition, then she will
evaluate whether it is true; and so on.
Notice that all of these ways of engaging with S, and the
subsequent chain of intellectual activities that they re-
spectively initiate (including the potential revision of ori-
ginal beliefs), will not be possible if the agent does not first
let S into her mind. The importance of open-mindedness—
that is, what makes it an intellectual virtue—is that it serves
as a gateway, so to speak, to potential argumentational,
cognitive or epistemic gains. When this gateway is
blocked, as in the case of someone who is closed-minded,
no serious consideration will be given to S and no gains,
obtained. This person’s reaction to novel standpoints is
likely to be one of automatic rejection. When the gateway
is accessible, the agent will engage novel standpoints in a
manner as the context demands, with the likely prospect for
intellectual gains.10 In particular, if she is motivated by the
goals on Cohen’s list (like a deepened understanding of
something), then she will be exercising open-mindedness
as a critical virtue. If she is motivated by the pursuit of
truth and knowledge, then she will be exercising it as an
epistemic virtue. Most likely, though, she, qua a knower
and an arguer, is motivated by both kinds of goals, in
which case she will be exercising it as an intellectual
virtue.
Even though I have only provided a sketch of my view,
its benefits, I hope, are clear: Not only can it make good
Cohen’s a priori intuition that open-mindedness is an in-
tellectual (i.e., argumentational and epistemic) virtue, but it
also allows an agent to be open-minded as a good arguer
without sacrificing her concomitant status as a good
knower.
4 Conclusion
This paper examines Cohen’s attempt to apply virtues to
argumentation theory, focusing, in particular, on his ana-
lysis of how open-mindedness can be regarded as a critical
virtue. I argue that as it is presented, Cohen’s analysis
involves a pair of claims that generates a tension for any-
one who is simultaneously an arguer and a knower (or
anyone who strives to be both). I contend that the problem
can be resolved once we clarify the nature of open-mind-
edness and recognize that virtues have application condi-
tions. Moreover, I advance a view that construes the
character trait in terms of its function. By understanding
open-mindedness as a willingness to take a novel view-
point seriously, it becomes easy to see how it can be an
intellectual virtue, that is, both epistemic and critical.11
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